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The paper examines the effects of demographic change on federal, state and local government expenditures in 
Germany. Public spending is decomposed into almost 30 categories (functions) and simple estimates of age cost 
profiles are derived. Using population forecasts and assuming timeinvariant age cost profiles we estimate the effects of 
the ageing of the Germany society on the level and structure of expenditures at the three layers of governments. Our 
results show that subnational governments - state and local governments - can expect demographic savings whereas the 
federal government will live to see a worsening of its fiscal stance. Thus one should expect that significant vertical 
expenditure imbalances will arise that - if institutional settings are left unchanged - will ask for an adjustment of 
revenue distribution within the federation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Germany, as well as most other industrialized countries faces pronounced demographic 
challenges in the next decades: An ageing society, a low reproduction rate, a declining 
population and workforce as well as significant redistributions of population within and 
across regions. These demographic changes will have considerable effects on the economy 
and virtually all policy areas. In recent years, a substantial body of "demo-economics" 
literature has developed and addresses issues such as the construction of a sustainable old-age 
pension system
1, the impact of ageing on health expenditures, the labour market
2 
(productivity, labour market participation etc.) and economic growth as well as public sector 
budgets in general.  
 
The present paper is devoted to an examination of the fiscal consequences of demographic 
changes in federal systems, a subject that has been rarely discussed.
3 Notable exceptions are 
the study of the Conference Board of Canada (2002) and the theoretical work of Echevarría 
(1995). Most studies that address fiscal issues take a look at the budget of the central 
government or the total government sector. However, in federal systems repercussions of 
demographics on public expenditures and revenues can divert significantly across the 
different levels of governments. In addition, at the subnational government level, the regional 
dimension of demographic change has to be taken into account. However, the latter subject is 
not touched in the subsequent discussion and we confine our examination to the central 
government level as well as the aggregate state and local government level. Contrary to the 
OECD practice the social security system is not included in our definition of the public sector. 
 
The purpose of the paper is to present preliminary results on the impact of demographic 
change upon the level and structure of expenditures by level of government as well as 
potential vertical fiscal imbalances across the different layers of government in Germany. Our 
results are preliminary because we do not take into account the revenue side and the evidence 
presented rests upon rather simplifying assumptions.
4 We start in section 2 with a brief 
discussion of the most important demographic facts in Germany. Section 3 outlines the fiscal 
federalism system in Germany and methodical issues are discussed in section 4. In section 5 
we construct very simple age cost profiles by government functions and develop estimates of 
potential vertical fiscal expenditure imbalances induced by demographic changes. A final 
section summarizes our results and outlines prospects for further research. 
 
 
2. Demographic change in Germany 
 
Looking at demographics in Germany one observes marked differences between East and 
West Germany. There are two main reasons for the east-west differential: After the fall of the 
iron curtain in 1989 the birth rate in East Germany dropped to a dramatically low rate of about 
0.75 in the early nineties. In recent years fertility has started to converge to the West German 
average of about 1.45. In addition, due to the poor economic performance of the East German 
economy there are rather strong east-west migration-flows. Hence, the East German 
population declined by about 7.5% in the period 1991 - 2003 whereas the population size in 
                                                 
1 See for example Börsch-Supan (1999), Dang (2001) or Turner et al. (1998). 
2 See for example Börsch-Supan (1996), Faruqee (2002) or Leibfritz et al. (1995). 
3 However, Färber (1988) presented a discussion of the budgetary impact of demographic changes for the former 
West Germany already 20 years ago.  
4 Recently we started a research project on the issues discussed in this paper and future research will relax many 
of our simplifying assumptions.   3
West Germany increased by about 5.9%. Low birth rates and high out-migration especially of 
younger persons considerably speed up the ageing process in East Germany. Consequently, 
the average age of the East German population will exceed that in West Germany by about 5 
years in 2030.  
 
Figure 1: Population size in Germany 2002 - 2030: Normalized series: 2002 = 100 
 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
 
Figure 2: Population aged 5 - 29 in East and West Germany as a share of total population 
 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
  
According to the population forecast
5 of the Federal Statistical Office of Germany total 
population in Germany will decline by about 4% in the period 2002 - 2030, see figure 1. In 
West Germany (excluding Berlin), a more or less stable population is expected in this period 
and until the year 2020 there will even be a slight increase. However, for the period after 2030 
the population size in West Germany is forecasted to drop significantly. In East Germany 
(excluding Berlin), the population size will decline by more than 10% until 2020 and in the 
year 2030 the population size will be almost 20% lower than in 2002. In the next step we look 
at the three most important age cohorts: The young generation, 5-29, the elderly, 65+, and the 
                                                 
5 The data on future demographic developments used in this report are derived from the "10th Coordinated 

































East Germany West Germany  4
work force, 15-65. The share of the age cohort 5-29 which demands the services of the 
education system (schools and universities) will decrease from about 26% in 2002 to about 
18% in East Germany and to about 24% in West Germany in 2020 (figure 2). However, in the 
years after 2020 there will be an east-west convergence process and the share of this age 
group will approach a level of about 21% in both parts of the country.  
 
The share of the elderly, 65+, is currently about 17% in East and West Germany. For the 
reasons mentioned above, the share of the elderly will increase considerably stronger in East 
Germany than in West Germany. In 2030 about 33% of the East German and about 27% of 
the West German population will at least be 65 years old, see figure 3. The most dramatic 
changes will be observed for the very old (80+), whose share will increase from about 3.9% in 
2002 to 7.3% in 2030 and to about 12.1% in 2050. There are also marked differences between 
East and West Germany with respect to the working age cohort, 15-65. Currently, in East 
Germany this age group amounts to a share of about 70% of the total population and slightly 
exceeds that in West Germany (67%). Up to the year 2030 this share will decline to about 
56% in East Germany and to about 61% in West Germany, see figure 4.
6 The main reasons 
for the demographic developments in Germany sketched above are the low total fertility rate, 
defined as the average number of children per women, and the increase in life expectancy. 
The total fertility rate declined from about 2.3 in the 60ties to about 1.45 at the turn of the 
century. In the EU, only Spain, Greece and Italy have lower fertility rates. On the other hand, 
life expectancy (of new-borns) in Germany is forecasted to increase from 74.8/80.8 
(male/female) in 2000 to about 80/85 (male/female) in 2030.
7 
 
Figure 3: Population aged (65+) in East and West Germany as a share of total population 
 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
 
                                                 
6 As a matter of course, both the share of the elderly, 65+, as well as the share of the labor force, depend upon 
the working or retirement age. One should expect that in the next decades the retirement age will increase 
significantly. In addition, one has to consider that the age cohort 15-65 is not a good estimator of the active labor 
force because of changes in the unemployment rate. (Female) labor market participation rate as well as changes 
in the length of the education period affect the potential labor force estimates.  
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Figure 4: Work force (15 - 65) in East and West Germany as a share of total population 
 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
 
 
3. The fiscal federalism system in Germany in a nutshell 
 
For our subsequent investigation some knowledge about fiscal federalism in Germany is 
necessary. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) consists of three levels of government: 
federal (Bund), state (Laender) and local (Gemeindeebene). The German constitution 
(Grundgesetz) defines the responsibilities of the different levels of government. Local 
governments are responsible in particular for local utilities and services such as water supply, 
sewage and waste disposal, the construction and maintenance of local roads, etc. As to 
education the local government sector is completely responsible for pre-primary education 
(kindergarten) and the construction as well as maintenance of school infrastructures (school 
buildings). In addition, local governments provide supplementary welfare benefits, especially 
social assistance benefits. These expenditures increased considerably in the past 25 years. 
However, in 2005 a labour market reform was implemented ("Hartz IV reform") which 
decreases local social assistance expenditures significantly because supplementary benefits to 
unemployed - financed by the federal government - as well as social assistance benefits for 
persons at working age - financed up to 2004 by local governments - are consolidated in a 
new tax financed welfare system at the federal level. The constitution guarantees communities 
the right to manage their own affairs independently. However, in practice this independence is 
quite restricted because the local governments rely heavily on grant financing from state 
governments and the vast majority of expenditures is mandatory and regulated by standards. 
The states are responsible for cultural affairs, school education (teachers), university 
education, the administration of justice as well as police. In housing and health services, both 
subnational government levels are involved. The federal government is responsible for 
foreign affairs, defence and supplementary benefits to unemployed persons. Moreover, the 
federal government provides considerable amounts of conditional as well as unconditional 
grants and transfers to the state level. 
 
The main characteristics of the fiscal federalism structure in Germany can shortly be 
summarized as follows: 
•  There is a predominance of joint taxes. In 2003 about 68% of all tax revenues 
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government only, about 4% to state government and about 8% to the local government 
sector.  
•  Subnational governments have a rather low power to set taxes. State governments are 
even more restricted than local governments. However, the federal government has to 
pass a law by voting in the Upper Chamber (Bundesrat) if it intends to change tax 
rates of joint taxes or tax rates of taxes that are earmarked to the states and the states 
participate in the legislation process. Thus, the states can jointly influence tax policy 
but none of the states can fix tax rates individually. In addition, the states and the 
federal government negotiate the distribution of tax revenues out of shared taxes 
between levels of government.  
•  At the state level there is a pronounced fiscal equalization system in which financially 
strong states make equalization payments to financially weak states. The federal 
government provides complementary federal grants (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen) 
to financially weak states. The strong equalization system brings about a rather weak 
correlation between state economic performance and per capita state revenues. 
•  Intergovernmental transfers are of considerable importance both between the federal 
and state government sector as well as between state governments and the local 
government sector. The rather high transfer intensity in Germany results in a severe 
loss of transparency of the flow of public resources. 
•  Finally, co-financing of tasks is quite common in Germany and consequently there is 
no clear division of (political and financial) responsibilities of the different layers of 
government.  
 
Table 1 presents data on the transfer system in Germany for the year 2001. Contrary to our 
definition of the government sector - federal, state and local government sector - we also 
include the social security system in the table because of its significant dependency on federal 
transfers. At the state level, about 16% of all expenditures are financed by other levels of 
governments, of which the federal government is the most important donor. In East Germany 
this share is close to 40% and in West Germany about 12%. Local governments cover about 
34% of their expenditures out of grants (from state governments) and here too we observe 
marked differences between East (almost 60%) and West (about 28%) Germany. About 17% 
of expenditures of the social security system are transfers out of the federal budget.  
 
Table 4 also reports the share of expenditures at the various levels of government that are 
spent as transfers to other levels of government. The federal government’s share is almost 
50%, the bulk of which are transfers to the social security system (about 55%) and to the state 
governments (about 30%). In West Germany about 20% of state expenditures are 
intergovernmental transfers, in East Germany this share amounts to about 35%, most of which 
are targeted towards the local government sector. In part B of the table we show the most 
important sources of revenues: Taxes and social security contributions (B.1) and transfers 
from other levels of governments (B.2). At the federal government level almost 90% of all 
revenues come out of taxes. At the state level this ratio is about 76% in West Germany and 
less than 50% in East Germany. Local governments in West Germany collect about 38% of 
their revenues out of taxes, whereas in East Germany this share is well below 20%.  
   7
Table 1: Key-Data on intergovernmental fiscal relations in Germany in 2001 
 
 Federal  state  local  social  sec. 
A.1 Share of expenditures financed by transfers from other levels of government 
total 1,4  16,2 33,7  17,1
West Germany    12,0 28,4 
East Germany    39,5 59,4 
A.2 Transfers to other levels of government as a share of total expenditures 
total 47,1  21,6 5,0  0
West Germany    19,7 5,5 
East Germany    35,2 2,3 
B.1 Share of revenues out of taxes, social security contributions etc. 
total 87,1  71,8 34,1  81,3
West Germany    76,4 37,8 
East Germany    49,5 16,1 
B.2 Share of revenues out of transfers from other levels of government 
total 1,5  18,0 34,6  17,2
West Germany    13,4 29,3 
East Germany    41,2 60,3 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
 
Thus, the figures in table 1 reveal the close fiscal interrelations between the different layers of 
governments at both the revenue and expenditure side of the budget. It is not difficult to 
imagine that these strong interdependencies make the political system in Germany rather 
sensitive to log-rolling and pork-barrel policies, create inefficiencies and inflexibilities. In 
addition, the properties of the fiscal federalism system in Germany have important 
implications for the discussion of the impact of demographic change: 
•  On the revenue side the predominance of shared taxes and the strong fiscal 
equalization system result in a "smoothing effect", i.e. differences in tax revenue 
capacity induced by demographics are smoothed away. 
•  The strong financial interrelations between the different levels of governments on the 
expenditure side contribute to some "risk sharing" of the effects of demographic 
changes, too. However, the smoothing effect is considerably lower than on the revenue 
side.  
 
We finally take a short look at the distribution of expenditures across levels of governments. 
Because of the importance of intergovernmental transfers the expenditures of the various 
government levels cannot simply be added. Therefore, we use net expenditures 
(“Nettoausgaben”) defined as total expenditures minus transfers received from other levels of 
governments. Thus, we can aggregate spending across the different layers of government. 
Figure 5 presents data on the (net) expenditure shares
8 of the three layers of government
9 in 
Germany before and after unification. The federal government sector accounts for about 50% 
of total net government expenditures. This share has not changed systematically since 1975. 
Expenditures of state governments amount to about 35% of total expenditures. In the 1990s 
                                                 
8 In 1997 there was a change in the statistical report on government expenditures in Germany. Up to the year 
1997 (public) hospitals were included in the fiscal data whereas after 1997 hospitals have been taken out of the 
public budgets. Only transfer payments to hospitals - most of which are earmarked to investment expenditures 
and some transfers to university hospitals – have been included in the data since 1998. We estimated state and 
local government sector spending before the year 1997 excluding hospitals in order to make the time series 
comparable.  
9 The federal government share also includes transfers to the EU as well as various special funds. The local 
government sector also includes special purpose local governments most of which are responsible for providing 
general community services such as waste disposal etc.   8
there has been an upward trend of this share whereas the share of local government 
expenditures slightly decreased. The main reason for this decline of local government’s 
expenditure share is the strong drop in infrastructure spending in recent years. The increase of 
the spending share at the state level is mainly due to the rise in pension payments for retired 
public servants and interest payments.  
 
Figure 5: (Net) spending shares of the federal, state and local government sector  



































federal government states local government sector
West Germany Germany
 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
 
In table 2 we report the importance of the different functions for public spending at the 
federal, state and local government sector. At the federal level the two most important 
spending categories are welfare (38%) and transfers to other levels of government (30%). The 
next important government function is defence (10%). Only about 4% of federal expenditures 
are spent on education. At the state level, spending on education has the highest share (about 
30%) and the second most important spending category are transfers to local governments 
(about 28%). Public order (police) as well as social welfare account for about 10% of state 
expenditures. Public administration (esp. state ministries) consumes about 6% of total 
expenditures. All other government functions are of rather small importance. At the local 
level, spending on social welfare amounts to about 30% of expenditures. Most of these 
expenditures are means-tested social assistance benefits. About 20% of local government 
resources are spent on community development and housing as well as education. 
   9
Table 2: Net expenditures by category as a share of total net expenditures at the federal, state 
and local government sector in Germany in fiscal year 2001 
 
   Federal State  Local 
1  General public services/administration  4,7 6,1 15,0 
2 Defence  9,2 0,0 0,0 
3  Public order & safety  0,9 10,4 6,1 
 3.1    police, etc.  0,8 5,7 6,1 
 3.2    jurisdiction, prisons, etc.  0,1 4,7 0,0 
4  Education and Research  3,9 29,8 19,6 
 4.1    schools, etc.  0,0 19,3 16,9 
 4.2    universities, etc.  0,8 8,1 0,0 
 4.3    other education  0,5 1,2 2,5 
 4.4    research outside universities  2,5 1,3 0,2 
5  Health and environmental protection  0,3 2,1 2,2 
6  Social Security & Welfare  38,2 9,7 30,3 
7  Housing & community amenities  0,7 2,4 18,5 
8  Recreational, cultural & religious affairs  0,2 2,2 8,9 
9  Fuel & energy  4,2 3,4 1,8 
10  Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting  0,5 1,7 0,2 
11  Transportation & communication  3,7 2,8 7,2 
12  Other economic affairs  3,6 1,8 5,0 
13  Other functions (esp. interjurisdictional 
transfers) 
30,0 27,5 -14,9 
  Total  100,0 100,0 100,0 
Source: Calculated from data provided by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
 
It should be noted that spending on health out of public budgets is of only minor importance 
at the federal, state and local public sector in Germany.
10 Public health expenditures are 
financed out of social security contributes. However, at the state and local government sector 
health related expenditures arise because the public sector provides investment grants for 
hospital buildings and homes for the elderly and the disbabled. In addition, there are means-
tested social assistance benefits for handicapped and elderly persons ("Hilfe zur Pflege").
11  
 
Table 3 reports the distribution of net expenditures by function across the three layers of 
government. We will only comment on the most notable facts. In public order and safety, the 
bulk of expenditures accrues at the state government level. In the education system, spending 
by the federal government is of only minor importance whereas the states account for about 
70% of education expenditures. 2/3 of welfare spending are borne the federal government 
which provides massive transfers to support the unemployed as well as the public pension 
system. Thus, from table 3 we can conclude that subnational governments are in charge of 
                                                 
10 In 2001 total health expenditures in Germany amounted to about 227 bn Euro (about 11% of GDP). The bulk 
of these expenditures were covered out of social security contributions whereas only about 8.1% of total health 
expenditures were financed out of the budgets of federal, state and local governments. 
11 However, these expenditures are covered in item 6 in table 2 (social welfare).   10
public services targeted to the younger generation (education) whereas expenditures of the 
federal government are biased towards the elderly. Consequently, one should expect that the 
demographic changes will increase the fiscal burden of the federal government whereas the 
subnational government sector might profit from the declining share of the younger 
generation. 
 
Table 3: Share of net expenditures by function of the federal, state and local government 
sector in Germany in fiscal year 2001 
 
   Federal  State  Local 
1  General public services/administration  30,6% 32,7% 36,7% 
2 Defence  100,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
3  Public order & safety  8,0% 72,3% 19,6% 
 3.1    police, etc.  10,5% 59,9% 29,6% 
 3.2    jurisdiction, prisons, etc.  3,1% 96,9% 0,0% 
4  Education and Research  11,0% 68,4% 20,6% 
 4.1    schools, etc.  0,2% 71,1% 28,7% 
 4.2    universities, etc.  10,7% 89,3% 0,0% 
 4.3    other education  22,2% 39,1% 38,6% 
 4.4    research outside universities  69,8% 28,2% 2,1% 
5  Health and environmental protection  11,0% 59,3% 29,6% 
6  Social Security & Welfare  66,6% 13,7% 19,7% 
7  Housing & community amenities  7,2% 20,7% 72,2% 
8  Recreational, cultural & religious affairs  3,8% 33,6% 62,6% 
9  Fuel & energy  54,8% 36,3% 8,9% 
10  Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting  25,8% 70,4% 3,8% 
11  Transportation & communication  42,6% 26,3% 31,0% 
12  Other economic affairs  52,1% 20,9% 27,0% 
13  Other functions (esp. interjurisdictional 
transfers) 
64,2% 47,7% -11,9% 
  Total  45,8% 37,1% 17,1% 
Source: Calculated from data provided by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
 
 
4. Some methodical issues 
 
Before we turn to our empirical investigation we examine some methodical issues that arise if 
the effects of demographic change on public budgets are examined. Total public expenditures 
can be written as: 
 





t j t E E
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, . 
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Ej,t denotes expenditures in spending category j in period t. A decomposition of expenditures 
by age groups can be achieved by using the age cost profile concept and rewriting public 
expenditures as: 
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N(x,t) denotes the population of the age x ( x is the maximum age) in period t und Nt = 
ΣxN(x) total population. The variable e(x,j,t) is the age cost profile which provides 
information on per capita spending on citizens aged x for the public good j (such as education, 
health, etc.) in period t. If the public good j is not age-specific (such as defence) the entries in 
e(x,j,t) are identical across all age groups. A corresponding age revenue profile can be 
constructed for taxes, user fees, social security contributions etc. In addition, one can also add 
other socio-demographic dimensions or construct multi-dimensional categorizations such as 
age and gender cohorts, membership to different ethnic groups (natives vs. immigrants), or 
types of households etc. If we had information about the age cost profiles of the various 
public sector spending categories as well as population forecasts - differentiated by age – we 
would be able to forecast the impact of demographic change on public expenditures. This 
would be a very simple exercise if we assumed that the age cost profile were time-invariant, 
that is e(x,j,t) = e(x,j,t+τ) = e(x,j), for τ > 0.  
 
As a matter of course, one should expect that age cost profiles differ considerably across 
various spending categories (functions). Spending on education for example is primarily 
targeted at the young whereas health expenditures are higher for the elderly than for the 
young. In some categories a clear differentiation according to age groups might be very 
difficult or even impossible, as for instance in general public service provision or in public 
order and safety. In addition, the cost of providing services to a specific age group is affected 
by the behaviour of other age groups. Kindergarten services are a good example for the latter. 
The "demand" for kindergarten services does not only depend on the number and age 
structure of the kids but also on social norms in societies, the female labour market 
participation rate etc. This means that the cost of providing kindergarten services can increase 
despite a drop in birth rates if for example female labour participation rates increase.
12 As a 
matter of course, numerous other factors affect age cost profiles. Thus for example, the 
efficiency of the public sector as well as input prices are important determinants of the cost of 
public service provision. Finally, one has to take into account that age cost profiles are hard to 
compare across different countries because public and private service provisions differ 
considerably. In Germany private universities as well as private schools are still of minor 
importance whereas in other countries, such as the US, private institutions in the education 
system are of far greater importance. Even stronger distinctions can be observed with respect 
to the financing of health care and the pension systems across countries.  
 
In federal systems different layers of government perform different tasks and therefore the 
aggregate age cost profiles vary across the layers of government. Consequently, spending of 
the different levels of government should have a quite varying sensitivity with respect to 
demographic change. Figure 6 presents stylized age cost profiles aggregated across all 
spending categories for the three layers of government taking into account the division of 
tasks in Germany. State and local government age cost profiles are expected to have a peak 
                                                 
12 In fact, the demand for kindergarten services should be considered a "derived" demand.   12
for younger cohorts due to the responsibility for education whereas the age cost profile of the 
federal government is expected to be biased towards the elderly. 
 
Figure 6: Stylized age cost profiles: per capita expenditure of the specific age groups 
across all government functions by level of government for Germany 
Source: Seitz (2004). 
 
We already mentioned that in Germany 2/3 of tax revenues come out of taxes and thus, the 
corresponding age revenue profiles should not be that much different across the layers of 
government in Germany. In addition, the fiscal equalization systems at the state and local 
government level as well as the high volume of interjurisdictional fiscal transfers should work 
towards a marked convergence of age revenue profiles across the three levels of governments. 
For the latter reason we restrain from considering age revenue profiles in this study.  
 
A final issue that has to be discussed is the stability of age cost and revenue profiles across 
time. One should not expect that these are time-invariant.
13 Thus for example, in the past we 
observed health care price indices to rise considerably faster than the average price level. This 
tendency - despite many policy actions to curb costs in the health sector - might well continue 
in the future resulting in a relative increase of the cost of servicing the elderly. In addition, the 
resources devoted to specific age groups (public education, cultural activities etc.) are decided 
upon in a political process of voting and the ageing process can result in a shift of political 
majorities that ask for different bundles of public goods. Finally, cohort behaviour changes 
over time, that means, that identical age cohorts at different times have different demands for 
public goods. Education is an good example: 20 years ago a smaller share of the young 
population attended universities and thus the demand for education of this cohort for this type 
of public services has been significantly lower than for the current living cohort in this age 
group. However, none of these and related issues are addressed in the present paper. 
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Table 4: Assumptions on age cost profile indicators by government function 
 
                                                         age group 
 
Public functions and expenditures 
0-6 6-20 20-28 28-65 65-80  80-100 
1.  General public 
             services/administration  
1 111  1  1
2.  Foreign  affairs  1 1 1 1 1 1
3.  Defence  1 1 1 1 1 1
4.  Public order & safety  0 1 1 1 0.5 0.5
5.  Jurisdiction & prison  0 1 1 1  0.5  0
6.  Schools  0 1 0 0 0 0
7.  Kindergarten  1 0 0 0 0 0
8.  Universities  0 0 1 0 0 0
9.  Financial support to students  0 1 1 0  0  0
10.  All other education   0 1 1 0  0  0
11.  Research outside universities  0 0 1 1  0  0
12.  Culture   0.2 1 1 1  1  0.2
13.  Health and environmental protection  0 1 1 1 0.5 0.5
14.  Housing & community amenities  0.2 0.2 1 1 0.2 0.2
15.  Agriculture, forestry & fishing  0 011  0  0
16.  Fuel & energy & water  0.2 1 1 1 0.2 0.2
17.  Transportation & communication  0.5 1 1 1 0.5 0.2
18.  Economic  enterprises  1 1 1 1 1 1
19.  Public property management  1 1 1 1  1  1
20.  Intergovernmental transfers etc.  1 1 1 1  1  1
21.  Pensions for retired public servants  0 0 0 0  1  1
22.  Administration of social welfare   1 1 1 1  1  1
23.  Transfers to the pension system  0 0 0 0  1  1
24.  Unemployment  etc.  0 0 1 1 0.5 0.2
25.  Social  assistance  1 1 1 1 1 1
26.  Youth  welfare  0.2 1 0.5 0 0 0
27.  Support  for  mothers  1 1 0 0 0 0
28.  Other social welfare   1 1 1 1  1  1
29.  Labour market policy and support for 
             the unemployed 
0 011  0  0
 
 
5. Some preliminary estimates on the effects of demographic change on public 
expenditures by level of government in Germany 
 
In this section we use a simple simulation technique to derive estimates of the effects of 
demographic change on public expenditures at the various levels of government in Germany 
subject to the following assumptions: 
1.  The population is divided into six age groups.  
2.  Age cost profiles are assumed not to change in the period 2001 to 2030. 
3.  The public expenditure structure is perfectly and instantly adjusted
14 to changes in the 
age composition as well as the size of the population.  
4.  Price effects (wage and price inflation) as well as real growth are disregarded. 
                                                 
14 In a short-run or medium-run perspective the assumption of immediate adjustment is rather unrealistic because 
of indivisibilities as well as resistance to adjustment by public servants and other interest groups. For empirical 
evidence in the education system see Poterba (1998), Baum and Seitz (2003), Kempkes and Seitz (2004).   14
5.  "Estimates" of age cost profiles are derived from data for the fiscal year 2001 as 
explained below. 
6.  We assume that the distribution of tasks between the different levels of governments 
as well as the legal and institutional settings do not change in the period 2001 to 2030. 
 
In the education system, assumption 3 implies for example that the total volume of education 
expenditures is adjusted proportionally to any change in the number of school-aged person 
leaving per capita spending for the relevant age group unchanged. Disregarding price and real 
growth effects (assumption 4) means that our estimates compare the level and structure of 
public expenditures in the year 2001 to that level and structure of public expenditures that 
would prevail if the number and age structure of the population in 2001 were identical to that 
forecasted for the year 2030. Thus, we conduct a comparative static experiment isolating the 
effects of demographic change. Under this set of simplifying assumptions it is rather easy to 
compare the structure and the volume of public expenditures by level of government in the 
year 2030 to that of 2001 and to examine the question whether vertical fiscal expenditure 
imbalances arise out of demographic changes.  
 
After discussing our assumptions we now turn to the derivation of highly stylized age cost 
profiles. All relevant assumptions about the "demand" for public services by the various age 
groups are reported in table 4. The entries in the table constitute a matrix of age-cost profile 
indicators which can be written as I(j,x). The index j = 1, ..J (J = 29) denotes the government 
function and the index x = 1, ..X (X = 6) is the age category. Per capita expenditure on a 
representative member of age group x in function j at the government level f is calculated as: 
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f denotes expenditure of the government level f (f = federal, state, local) in government 
function j in fiscal year 2001. A "0" entry in table 4 means that the specific age group does 
not consume the public good provided within the specific government function. The entries in 
table 4 have been derived by examining the public services provided in the various age groups 
and are based upon "subjective" judgements as well as empirical facts
15. Note that the matrix 
I(j,x) is identical across government levels but age cost profiles differ because the government 
sectors spend different amounts of money in the various categories. In a second step we 
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15 For instance, we collected data on the age structure of students, social assistance recipients, people imprisoned, 
etc. See Seitz (2004) for detailed evidence. In our future work we will discuss the rationale of the entries in table 
4 in more detail.    15
ε(x,f) denotes the share of expenditures at government level f
16 devoted to age group x.
17 It is 
important to note the differences between age cost profiles and age expenditure shares. 
Whereas age cost profiles provide information about per capita spending per person at some 
specific age, the age expenditure shares provide information about the share of public 
expenditures spent on a specific age group.
18 
 
Figure 7 presents estimates of per capita spending on each age group aggregated across all 
government functions by level of government in 2001 in Germany.
19 The highest per capita 
expenditures we get at the the federal level for the elderly due to the massive transfer 
payments of the federal government to the public pension system. State and local government 
spending on the other side is biased towards the younger generation. The main reason for this 
is the fact that responsibility for the education system - including kindergarten - rests upon 
states and local governments.
20 
 
Figure 7: Net spending per capita of the relevant age group across all government 
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Source: Own calculations based on assumptions as set out in table 4 and data on net expenditures provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office. 
 
In a next step we forecast expenditures in 2030 at each level of government using the age cost 
profiles derived above and population forecasts. The resulting age expenditure shares are 
presented in figure 8a (federal), 8b (state) and 8c (local). We can see that the share of 
expenditures devoted to the younger generation drops significantly for all levels of 
government whereas spending shares on the elderly increase. Taking into account our 
discussion above as well as the trend towards the ageing of the society this result is as a 
                                                 
16 By construction expenditure shares within each spending categories are identical across the three layers of 
government. 
17 In equation (3) and (4) we suppressed the time index t for the sake of convenience. 
18 Recall, that in our definition the social security system is not part of the government sector and therefore social 
security spending is not included in the list of functions covered in table 4. 
19 By assumption, these are identical to the age cost profiles in 2030! 
20 At the current stage of our research we implicitly assume that the retirement behaviour of public servants is 
identical to that of the total population. In future research we will refine our method by looking at the age 
structure of public servants more precisely (see for example Fester and Thum, 2003). Pensions to public servants 
are of considerable importance in Germany and amounted to about 2.1% of spending at the federal level, 7.4% at 
the state level and 4.0% at the local government sector in 2001.   16
matter of course no surprise. However, the crucial questions are, whether these changes result 
in an increase in total expenditures and whether this process is accompanied by vertical fiscal 
expenditure imbalances. 
 
Figure 8a: Age specific expenditure shares across all government functions at the federal 
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Source: Own calculations based on assumptions as set out in table 4 and data on net expenditures provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office. 
 
Figure 8b: Age specific expenditure shares across all government functions at the state 












0-6  6-20 20-28 28-65 65-80 80-100
2001 2030
 
Source: Own calculations based on assumptions as set out in table 4 and data on net expenditures provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office. 
   17
Figure 8c: Age specific expenditure shares across all government functions at the local 
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Source: Own calculations based on assumptions as set out in table 4 and data on net expenditures provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office. 
 
Therefore, in a final step we calculate the impact of demographic change on expenditures by 
level of government in the period 2001-2030. The results are reported in table 5. The level of 
total government expenditure is likely to increase by about 2.7% with rather dramatic 
differences across government levels. Whereas total federal expenditures will increase by 
about 11%, state and local level expenditures will decline by 3.7% and 6.7% respectively. 
Because the population declines in the period 2001 to 2030, per capita spending of the federal 
government will grow even slightly stronger and per capita spending at the subnational level 
will decline by less than the volume of expenditure. 
 
Table 5: Changes in expenditures by level of government induced by demographic change in 
the period 2001 - 2030 assuming time-invariant age cost profiles 
 
 total  expenditure 
growth 
total per capita 
expenditure growth 
Federal government  11,41% 13,18%
State Government Sector  -3,65% -2,12%
Local Government Sector  -6,66% -4,93%
Total Government Sector (without social 
security) 2,72% 4,36%
Source: Own calculations based on assumptions as set out in table 4 and data on net expenditures provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office. 
  
As a matter of course, the different expenditure growth rates reported in table 5 have 
considerable effects upon the distribution of expenditures across the three levels of 
government, see Table 6. In the year 2001 the federal government accounted for about 45.7% 
of total public net expenditures. This share will increase to about 49.6% in 2030. In the same 
period, the state expenditure share will decrease by about 2.2 percentage points and by about 
1.5 percentage points at the local level. The reason for the strong negative impact on state 
government spending is the drop in both the share and the number of younger people that 
demand (expensive) education services, which are mainly accounted for by the state 
government sector. On the other hand, the federal budget seems to bear the main fiscal burden   18
of demographic change and will get under fiscal pressure as the number and share of the 
elderly increases. The reason for this is the fact that in the future - taking the current legal and 
institutional framework as given - larger amounts of federal money will have to be spent on 
supplementary transfers to the public pension system. 
 
Table 6: Total net expenditure shares in 2001 and 2030 by government level in Germany 
 
 2001  2030 
federal government  45,7% 49,6%
state governments  37,0% 34,8%
local governments  17,2% 15,7%
 
Source: Own calculations based on assumptions as set out in table 4 and data on net expenditures provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office. 
 
Thus, our simulation results suggest that demographic change will result in significant vertical 
fiscal imbalances in Germany "favouring" the subnational government sector. As there are no 
"automatic" adjustment mechanisms that bring about a corresponding change in the 
distribution of tax revenues across the three layers of government, the federal budget will live 
to see a deterioration of its fiscal stance as a result of the ageing process in Germany.  
 
 
6. Conclusions and prospects for further research 
  
The paper discussed the fiscal consequences of demographic change in a federal system 
taking Germany as an example. Using a very simple technique we derived estimates of the 
likely impact of the ageing of the society on federal, state and local government expenditures. 
The revenue side has been completely disregarded because of the peculiarities of the German 
system of revenue distribution across the various levels of government. Our preliminary 
results suggest that the federal government will have to bear the main fiscal burden of 
demographic change whereas subnational governments can realize demographic savings, if 
expenditures are adjusted to the changing size and age structure of the population. Most of the 
savings arise in the education system because of the decline of the relevant age group. This 
result is in sharp contrast to a recent study of the EU Economic Policy Committee (2003). The 
reason for these different results is the fact that the EU-study assumes an increase in per 
pupil/student expenditure in Germany due to an increasing share of young people attending 
university in the next decades.
21 In addition our results suggest that in the near future 
significant vertical imbalances will occur in Germany. These imbalances ask - if our estimates 
are at least qualitatively correct - for an adjustment of revenue distribution in the federal 
system or stiff policy measures to curb the impact of the costs of ageing upon the federal 
budget. It is interesting to note, that a recent study for Canada, see Conference Board of 
Canada (2002), arrived at quite different conclusions. This study predicts that ageing will put 
pressure on provinces and will contribute to an improvement of the fiscal stance of the federal 
government. The main reason for the differences between Canada and Germany seems to be 
that the Canadian Provinces are responsible for providing tax financed health care. Thus the 
federal distribution of the fiscal burden of demographic change can be quite different across 
federal countries due to varying institutional frameworks.   
 
                                                 
21 However, the arguments in this study are by no means convincing because the well developed vocational 
training system in Germany is not properly taken into account.   19
Our procedure rests upon rather mechanical forecasts of the effect of demographic change on 
public spending. Future research has to develop more refined methods. Accounting for cohort 
effects appears to be one of the most important factors in our opinion. Future cohorts might 
have different preferences than cohorts currently living (see for example the increase in the 
demand for education) and the size of the cohorts might affect cohort behaviour. An increase 
in the share of the elderly for example increases the per capita cost of providing services to 
the elderly for the working-age cohort which might result in downward pressure on the supply 
of per capita public services for the elderly. For education the reverse effect should apply. In 
addition, public choice aspects have to be incorporated. One should expect that 
intergenerational conflicts might arise because the political power of the elderly increases 
relatively to that of younger cohorts and this should have an impact on the provision of public 
services. Endogenous policy responses should also be modelled. Fiscal pressure created by 
demographic change will induce changes in policy such as reducing service levels, increasing 
private contributions to cover cost, changing the financing of the social welfare system, etc. 
Finally, all feedback-effects of changing demographics upon the economy (prices, 
employment, growth, etc.) have been completely neglected by us. Thus, a lot of important 
issues remain for further research. 
 
Without doubt, our very simple simulation model has considerable deficiencies. Due to rather 
restrictive and simplifying assumptions our results should be considered as preliminary 
estimates of the likely effects of demographic change on spending in the German federal 
system. However, due to the division of tasks among the different layers of government one 
should expect that at least the qualitative main conclusion - increased spending pressure at the 
federal level and the possibility to achieve expenditure savings at the subnational level - 
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